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1. Introduction  
Social and environmental pressures, challenges and their economic and physical 
consequences have been increasing recently. Businesses need to reconsider their organisational 
aspects such as corporate governance, incentives, accountability, internal transparency, and 
market reaction in an attempt to meet the needs of various stakeholders (Eccles et al., 2014). 
Companies are now disclosing information related to their social and environmental agenda in 
their annual reports. The provisions of this information, along with supplementary corporate 
social responsibility (CSR hereafter) reports are increasingly finding favour with some 
investors (Steiner, 2012). Investors are seeking to invest in companies which are both profitable 
and are acting responsibly in terms of their environment – those companies which make the 
‘world a better place’ (Steiner, 2012). It appears that considering long-term drivers of value 
could help investors in understanding social and environmental values, and accelerate the 
adjustments of their valuation models to include more nuanced measures of long-term value 
creation (Connor, 2010; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010). Previous literature shows that 
companies with high CSR scores have better access to finance, and that over time, analysts’ 
investment recommendations are increasingly positive (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010; Cheng et 
al., 2014). The market has interest in companies that integrate their sustainability agenda into 
strategy and operations (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010; Eccles et al., 2011; Eccles et al., 2012). 
Financial analysts act as information intermediaries (Peek, 1997; García-Meca and 
Martínez, 2007; Simpson, 2010; Klettke, 2014) where they collect and process a large amount 
of publicly available information (Orens and Lybaert, 2010), evaluate firms’ performance, 
make forecasts about their future prospects (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Frankel et al., 2006), and 
thereby help the investment community to make better and more efficient investment decisions 
(Capstaff et al., 2000; García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2006; Orens and Lybaert, 2010; 
Simpson, 2010; Klettke, 2014). Non-financial information, such as social, environmental and 
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governance data, particularly quantifiable and verifiable information that is easy to integrate 
into valuation models is of value relevance to financial analysts (Eccles et al., 2011). Financial 
analysts are more likely to pay attention to environmental issues and to consider the value of 
climate data and alternative strategies before making investment decisions (Stoner and 
Backlund, 2014). The interest in non-financial information has increased with the growth of 
the socially responsible index (SRI) (Eccles et al., 2011). This was also combined with 
increased competition among companies, technology innovations, and globalisation (Orens 
and Lybaert, 2007). Previous literature mostly examines the appetite of the US market for such 
data (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2012). For this reason, 
and with the greater concerns about climate change beyond the US focus, it will be of interest 
to examine environmental-related disclosures within an international context, specifically the 
UK market. 
This paper investigates the impact of quality/quantity environmental disclosures on 
analyst recommendations. Previous studies focus on CSR and examine its impact on sell-side 
analyst assessment or analyst forecast accuracy by considering CSR ratings and the existence 
of stand-alone reports. Disclosure ratings are mainly based on the amount of voluntary 
information provided by companies in their annual reports (Botosan, 1997; Eccles et al., 2011). 
On the other hand, qualitative disclosure represents management effectiveness in capturing 
profitable opportunities (Eccles et al., 2011), and reflects real commitment in environmental 
strategies. Disclosure quality can be seen as a performance indicator (Eccles et al., 2011) that 
reduces information asymmetry which reduces investors’ risk and increases shares’ liquidity 
(Healy et al., 1999; Orens and Lybaert, 2007). Consequently, this helps in enhancing 
investment decisions (Orens and Lybaert, 2007; Orens and Lybaert, 2010). Moreover, 
qualitative disclosures are selective, not random, and may result from managerial attempts to 
enhance disclosure quality (Al-Shaer et al., 2017). Therefore, it is more likely that discretionary 
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qualitative disclosures are of value-relevance. Managers’ discretionary behaviour also involves 
social and environmental choices in their companies.  
This paper contributes to the academic literature by empirically examining the 
association between sell-side analyst recommendations on both innate and discretionary 
components of environmental disclosures within the UK context. This is a significant extension 
of the existing literature which has focused on the related association between analyst 
forecasts/recommendations and CSR, mainly measured by CSR ratings or a dummy variable 
reflecting the existence of supplementary CSR reports in different international setting. The 
paper focuses on environmental disclosures in companies’ annual reports. Annual reports are 
the main public source of corporate information (Botosan, 1997, p.7). They are produced 
regularly and are easily accessible by researchers (Chan et al., 2014). Furthermore, annual 
reports are considered the main source of information for investors therefore any details related 
to companies’ social and environmental strategies will be taken from firms’ annual reports 
(Spence, 2009)1. This study is valuable to the investor-focused literature. Firstly, it provides a 
broader assessment of the effect of CSR by focusing on the quality and quantity of 
environmental disclosures for UK companies and sell-side analyst decisions. The paper 
resolves both volumetric and qualitative measures from environmental disclosures by adopting 
a method developed by Beck et al. (2010). The ‘CONI’ approach measures information 
diversity, content, and volume. It involves dual qualitative and quantitative measurement which 
is suitable for the purpose of this paper. Secondly, it attempts to disentangle whether the 
components of disclosures reflect firm-specific characteristics or capture managerial choices 
for growth and long-term investment strategies, and the impact this may have on analyst 
                                                            
1 Knutson (1992) states ‘at the top of every analyst’s list (of financial reports they use) are the annual reports to shareholders. 
It is the major reporting document and every other financial report is in some respect subsidiary or supplementary to it’.  
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recommendations. The topic is of interest to contemporary accounting scholars and responds 
to calls for further research into how analysts use non-financial data such as environmental data 
in making recommendations (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et 
al., 2012). 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. 
Section 3 provides a theoretical framework in order to develop hypotheses suitable for 
answering the research question. Section 4 sets out the research study in terms of sample data 
and models. While section 5 reviews the empirical results. The final section draws conclusions. 
2. Literature review  
Prior literature examines the impact of non-financial data on analyst forecast accuracy (e.g., 
Vanstraelen et al., 2003; Bhat et al., 2006; Byard et al., 2006; García-Meca and Martínez, 2007; 
Orens and Lybaert, 2007; Orens and Lybaert, 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Dorestani and 
Rezaee 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Chang et al., 2014). Vanstraelen et al. (2003) examine the 
relationship between nonfinancial disclosure levels and analyst forecast accuracy and 
dispersion using a European dataset of firms operating in Belgium, Germany, and the 
Netherlands. The study uses a detailed nonfinancial disclosure scoring system based on The 
List of Nonfinancial Information Desired by Users from the AICPA Jenkins Committee 
database. Results show that large internationally-oriented companies tend to provide more 
nonfinancial disclosure. Also, forward looking nonfinancial information is significantly 
associated with lower dispersion and higher accuracy in financial analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Aerts et al. (2007) aim to analyse and to compare how North American and European firms 
choose the quality of their web-based performance disclosure and how such disclosure affects 
financial analysts’ earnings forecasts. Results show North American firms provide more web-
based performance disclosure than European firms and that the web-based performance 
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disclosure is associated with a decrease in analyst forecasts’ dispersion for North American 
firms. Dhaliwal et al. (2012) examine the relationship between disclosures of nonfinancial 
information and analyst forecast accuracy using an international dataset. The study measures 
non-financial information disclosure using an indicator variable that equals 1 if the concerned 
company issues stand-alone CSR report and 0 otherwise. Findings show that the issuance of 
stand-alone CSR reports in countries that are more stakeholders oriented is associated with 
lower analyst forecast error.  
 Few studies have sought to uncover the link between CSR and analyst 
recommendations (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010; Eccles et al., 2011). The impact of CSR on 
analyst recommendations has mostly been done based on the US context. Ioannou and Serafeim 
(2010) examine data on 4,109 companies over a 16-year period and argue that analysts are 
giving a positive reaction in the form of recommendation towards CSR activities in recent 
years. Such reaction is perceived as a legitimate behaviour with the gradual weakening of 
agency-based institutional logic that provides an unfavourable view for firms that undertake 
CSR through the emergence of stakeholder orientation. The study measures CSR using the 
scores provided by the KLD database and finds that sell-side analysts perceived CSR initiatives 
as an unfavourable behaviour from 1993-1997. Since 1997, however, the perception has 
become more positive. This paper will build on Ioannou and Serafeim’s paper by considering 
the content and comprehensiveness of CSR disclosures provided in companies’ annual reports 
(Marquis and Toffel, 2012). The information published in annual reports helps to capture 
narrative statements as well as specific and verified ones, unlike CSR ratings that mostly 
capture information quantity (Botosan, 1997).  
Financial analysts are increasingly using non-financial information in order to make 
investment decisions (Ho and Wong, 2004; García-Meca and Martínez, 2007; Orens and 
Lybaert, 2007). Breton and Taffler (2001) argue that non-financial qualitative factors are the 
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most significant drivers of analyst decisions, specifically the analysis of corporate management 
strategy. The authors were interested in the narrative part of annual reports, and the importance 
of different information types in explaining analysts’ forecast recommendations. Roger and 
Grant (1997) recommend further investigation of the relationship between analyst 
recommendations and information usage where the narrative sections of annual reports are of 
relevant value. Previts et al. (1994) argue that financial reporting provides an important but 
incomplete basis for the sell-side analyst forecast of company performance and Bradshaw 
(2004) argue that the value of analyst recommendations must lie in the additional information 
that analysts incorporate beyond financial information such as management quality, customer 
constancy and environmental data. Orens and Lybaert (2007) argue that in their reports 
financial analysts mention more frequently information related to corporate governance and 
social and environmental issues, therefore it is more likely that corporate managers will make 
an effort to voluntarily disclose information related to the environment in their annual reports 
especially given that the investment community relies extensively on analysts’ 
recommendations. Eccles et al. (2011) argue that sell-side analysts issue more optimistic 
information for companies with higher sustainability scores, and they take into account the 
financial implications of GHG emissions in their investment recommendations. Investors are 
interested in knowing the degree of transparency in disclosing social and environmental 
information policies and performance. The study shows that the sell-side analysts are interested 
in GHG emission information and they need to incorporate a broader set of non-financial 
information to get a more holistic view of the business.  
3. Theoretical framework and hypotheses development 
Voluntary disclosure of non-financial information reduces information asymmetry (Lang and 
Lundholm, 2000; Orens and Lybaert, 2007) which tends to reduce investors’ risk and improve 
the liquidity of the companies’ shares (Healy et al., 1999; Orens and Lybaert, 2007). 
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Consequently, this helps in enhancing investment decisions (Orens and Lybaert, 2007; Orens 
and Lybaert, 2010). Although corporate environmental disclosure in annual reports is 
increasingly an important issue for investors, public policy makers and the general public (De 
Villiers and Van Staden, 2011), mere narrative statements may negatively affect investor 
confidence in environmentally friendly firms which will consequently impact on the market 
interest in socially responsible investments (Delmas and Burbano, 2011). Managers need to 
improve the transparency and reduce rhetoric statements about corporate environmental 
activities through higher quality corporate environmental disclosures (Delmas and Burbano, 
2011). If this is true, it could be that analysts’ decisions rely on the type and form of information 
provided.  
Francis et al. (2005) argue that high quality information that is associated with 
discretionary decisions is used by analysts to form their valuation decisions while information 
driven by firm-specific characteristic does not seem to affect their decisions. The incentives 
which drive implementation decisions in determining differences in disclosure quality are of 
value relevance in decision-making and assessments amongst analysts and investors. Thus 
where disclosures are high quality and go beyond what is expected, analysts tend to produce 
favourable buy recommendations. On the other hand, generalised statements that companies 
are expected to make anyway will not help analysts in their judgments. The discretionary vs. 
innate analogy has been applied to research on earning management and accrual quality, and 
the use of information risk theory (Guay et al., 1996; Subramanyam, 1996; Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002; Cohen, 2003; Francis et al., 2005). According to Leuz and Verrecchia (2005) 
capital investment decisions are influenced by reporting quality where the firm-investor 
alignment will be damaged with low quality of reporting. The market has also interest in non-
financial data with the growing concerns of climate change and other environmental risks, and 
in examining how well companies are incorporating their sustainability agenda into strategy 
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and procedure (Eccles et al., 2011). Therefore investigating the innate vs. discretionary factors 
that drive environmental disclosure and their impact on capital investment valuation decision 
is of value relevance. 
Agency theory focuses on conflict of interest between agents and principals where 
managers’ main responsibility is to increase shareholders’ wealth (see Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Its assumptions have been criticized to be too limited (Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012; 
Ims et al., 2014). Criticisms of agency theory explains the investigation of managerial 
performance that goes beyond extrinsic motivation by considering the existential, social, 
ecological perspectives reflected in such performance (Ims et al., 2014). Fehr and Falk (2002) 
ague that economic incentives may have an adverse impact on managerial performance and 
Ims et al. (2014) argue that human behaviour is social and has to be understood in interaction 
with other people. In contrast to agency theory, stewardship theory considers managers as non-
opportunistic and self-motivated, and have intrinsic benefits and moral duties not driven by 
economic values (Francoeur et al., 2015). Stewardship theory explains not only managers’ 
commitment towards shareholders but also other stakeholders where managers might also 
undertake environmentally sound actions because they enjoy acting as stewards (Francoeur et 
al., 2015). Davis et al. (1997) argue that there are non-economic factors such as sociological 
and psychological factors that influence shareholders and managers relationship. Managers are 
not only driven by their individual goals but also by other goals where honesty, loyalty and 
trust in agent behaviour is also possible (Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012).  Ims et al. (2014, 
p.354) state that ‘the assumption of opportunism inherent in principal–agent models, as well as 
the assumption that opportunism can be managed by monitoring and incentives, in fact, creates 
more opportunism’. Stewardship theory suggests a different dimension of opportunism where 
managers have intrinsic incentives and could be opportunistic for growth or self-realisation 
(Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012).  
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Recent changes in internal managerial practice with the increase in legitimate 
awareness of CSR in the eyes of both shareholders and analysts have changed analysts’ 
perceptions (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010). Managerial disclosure of environmental 
information that is quantifiable, qualitative and comparable against trend signals the firm’s 
social behaviour and its relationship with various stakeholders. Firms that take care of various 
stakeholders are more likely to attract shareholders classified as “universal investors” (Stout, 
2012) who are not only interested in buying firm’s equity shares but also value stakes in the 
community, the economy and the entire planet (Luo et al., 2015; p.124). When shareholders 
act as universal investors, analysts are more likely to serve as information pathways connecting 
the views of shareholders and stakeholders (Luo et al., 2015), and to discuss various types of 
CSR-related information, including environmental issues, in their analyst reports. 
The current paper posits that companies with better quality disclosures that result from 
managerial practices will be associated with favourable recommendations. While Ioannou and 
Serafeim (2010) argue that it is the shift from agency logic dominance in the financial markets 
to the stakeholder orientation that has affected investment analysts’ reaction over the last forty 
years, it could also be the degree of transparency associated with disclosures that reflect firms’ 
real commitment to environmental strategies and engagement with stakeholders (Dhaliwal et 
al., 2011) and the level of managerial discretion. 
To test these relationships, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H1: Corporate environmental disclosures that are of high quality and influenced by managerial 
choices (discretionary) will help sell-side analysts to produce favourable buy 
recommendations. 
H2: Corporate environmental disclosures that are of mere volume are not useful in producing 
favourable buy recommendations. 
Page 9 of 41 Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
10 
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Sample and dependent variable  
The sample includes UK FTSE 350 companies continuously listed in the period 2007-2011 
with available forecast and earnings up to 20142. After dropping companies with missing 
financial data the resulting sample includes 177 companies per year. Environmental disclosures 
were collected from companies’ annual reports and analysts’ recommendations and forecast 
errors were obtained from the I/B/E/S database in the years following the publication of 
companies’ annual reports. Other financial data were taken from DataStream. The dependent 
variable is the consensus (mean) investment recommendation for each company-year pair 
(RECCON). The I/B/E/S database collects all published analyst recommendations and then 
creates an equally weighted average. It records analyst recommendation on a five-point scale: 
1 for ‘strong buy’; 2 for ‘buy’; 3 for ‘hold’; 4 for ‘underperform’; and 5 for ‘sell 
recommendation’ (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010). Following Ioannou and Serafeim (2010), I 
invert this scale so more favourable recommendations take a higher value. 
4.2.Disclosure Index  
The annual reports for five years 2007-2011 for each sample company were analysed as the 
primary source for environmental narrative. Various studies have focused on the role of annual 
reports as basic data source for environmental reporting (Gray et al., 1995; Deegan and Gordon, 
1996; Wilmshurst and Frost, 2000; Albertini, 2011). The variability of information provided in 
                                                            
2 The urgency of environmental issues have been made more urgent in the last ten years by a number of recent initiatives and 
observations (for e.g. the Climate Change Act 2008). Factors including climate change and a growing world population have 
increased the pressure on energy, natural resources and the wider environment. UK companies are arguably recognising that 
their day-to-day operations have an environmental impact and that they have responsibility to manage, measure and report on 
this impact through better information provision. There will always be demands for more research on this important issue 
covering a more recent dataset and providing a comparison with different international settings. 
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annual reports whether mere narrative statements as well specific type of data helps in 
capturing information diversity, content, and volume as applied in CONI approach.  
Studies on social and environmental disclosure have applied the content analysis 
technique using the mechanistic approach or the qualitative approach. The quantitative 
approach focuses on the volume of information disclosed or the frequency of disclosure where 
unit of analysis can be word, sentence, page or phrase (Gray et al., 2001; Campbell, 2003; Gao 
et al., 2005). Mechanistic content analysis studies also capture the frequency of disclosure in 
terms of whether an item is present or not present (Kolk, 1999; Campbell, et al., 2006). 
Researchers that adopted this approach were debating on the unit of analysis used, whether it 
is a word (Cambell, 2003; Gao et al., 2005), page (Patten, 1991), sentence (Wilmshurst and 
Frost, 2000; Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004), or phrase (Beck et al., 2010). Phrases or themes are very 
powerful tools that are not constrained by a grammatical unit. The use of themes and/or phrases 
as the level of resolution controls for varying length of sentence (which would be a crude 
measure). Word count offers the disadvantage that it is often difficult to correctly code a single 
word by context and by category3. Phrases and/or clauses are, by their nature, contextually 
situated, and are internally coherent around a given motif or theme. This means that clauses 
can be meaningfully coded, located in context and reliably recorded. On the other hand, the 
qualitative approach focuses on the narrative of every theme being analysed by giving a scale 
to different levels of social responsibility disclosure. This allows a better understanding of the 
                                                            
3 Words are applicable when each word is weighted for meaning before being included in the narrative, however sometimes 
words may be part of one or more disclosure categories which would cause double coding. The page is considered a very 
straight forward technique for detecting the quantity of disclosure but it can only describe one single large category without 
being able to capture the narrative tangled in subcategories. Sentences differ in length, style and grammatical choice. However, 
one sentence can reflect the information content in more than one category (Campbell and Abdul Rahman, 2010; Beck et al., 
2010). 
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narrative meaning and the richness of that meaning (Robertson and Nicholson, 1996; Toms, 
2002; Beck et al, 2010).  
In order to adequately resolve both volumetric and qualitative measures from 
environmental disclosures, a method developed by Beck et al., (2010) was employed (called 
The ‘CONI’ approach). Environmental disclosure data were collected manually and captured, 
using clauses or ‘themes’ as the unit of coding, from each report and entered onto a spreadsheet 
both volumetrically and include a qualitative assessment of each clause using a 1-5 scale. As 
with other content analyses, the reliability of the instrument was assisted by a representative 
number of annual reports being double coded by a second coder. Disambiguation rules were 
employed consistently once an ambiguous coding decision was encountered. Volumetric 
analysis was undertaken by counting phrases or themes and longitudinal stability was assured 
by a sample of 2007 reports being recoded after the completion of the 2011 cohort4.  
The study adopted a method developed by Beck et al. (2010). The ‘CONI’ approach 
measures information diversity, content, and volume. It involves dual qualitative and 
quantitative measurement. Beck et al. (2010) applied the CONI instrument to a matched sample 
of 14 pairs of companies from the UK and Germany over a five-year period. They then applied 
a matrix-based content analysis instrument that captured all information disclosed and allocated 
each chunk of information a score for qualitative analysis. Environmental narrative in this 
paper was coded by categories (Appendix1)5 that were arrived at by analysing previous 
literature for common themes and patterns (Wiseman, 1982; Cormier and Gordon, 2001; Beck 
et al., 2010). The CONI approach consisted of three stages. The first step was to code the 
narrative from the annual reports into categories. So instead of capturing the relevant meaning 
                                                            
4 50 annual reports have been sent to a second coder for reliability test. The level of inter-coder reliability has been measured 
by using Krippendorff agreement index (Krippendorff, 1980).  Inter-coder reliability tests resulted in a Krippendorff alpha 
value of 87.8% (Krippendorff, 1980). Disagreement cases have been solved after discussion between the two coders. 
5 Categories SER and IRP were merged with GEN category due to the scarcity of information disclosed in a large number 
companies’ annual reports. 
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by words, sentences or paragraphs, the study analyses the narrative of companies’ annual 
reports at the phrase level which will help coding the totality of meaning. The second step 
involved the qualitative measure by coding the information based on (1-5) scale of ascending 
order of information adequacy: 1 = pure narrative disclosure related to category definition; 2 = 
pure narrative disclosure with more details; 3 = quantitative disclosures addressing issue in a 
numerical way; 4 = quantitative disclosures with narrative explanation; 5 = quantitative 
disclosures including narrative statements demonstrating year comparison. Each company is 
assessed with reference to its highest ranking phrase not the highest frequency. The third step 
involves the quantitative measurement based on number of disclosure items per category using 
phrase count. CONI’s dual measurement approach gives it an advantage over an index-based 
meaning oriented analysis in that the latter does not combine the meaning with disclosure 
volume (Beck et al., 2010).  
4.3.Control variables  
Several control variables were included to investigate the relationship between environmental 
disclosure and investment recommendation. The paper controls for the level of firm’s 
environmental performance and argues that analysts may take into account its level when 
making their recommendations. The study employs a quantitative measure as a proxy of 
environmental performance (ENVPER), that is the total recycled, treated or processed waste 
produced in tonnes as a percentage of total waste produced in tonnes (Al-Tuwaijri et al., 2004; 
Clarkson et al., 2008) collected from Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database. The higher the ratio 
of recycled waste to total waste the better the firm’s environmental performance (Al-Tuwaijri 
et al., 2004). Therefore, it is more likely that analysts tend to produce favourable 
recommendations for firms with high waste recycled ratio.  
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The paper also controls for forecast error to account for analyst characteristics. Ertimur 
et al. (2007) show that analysts translate forecast into recommendation, and that profitable 
recommendations are related to firms with value-relevant earnings. Bradshaw (2004) examines 
the consistency between analysts’ earnings forecast and stock recommendation and found that 
analysts’ long-term estimates explain their recommendations. Schipper (1991) calls for better 
understanding of how earnings forecasts are related to stock recommendation, and Loh and 
Mian (2006) find that analysts who issue more accurate earnings forecasts also issue more 
favourable stock recommendation. Francis and Soffer (1997) argue that since analysts spend 
more time and effort before issuing unfavourable recommendations, the forecast error for sells 
is expected to be smaller than for buys. This paper will provide evidence on how analysts’ 
forecasts are related to recommendations. Analysts’ forecast error (FERRORY), defined as the 
absolute value of the difference between a firm’s actual earnings per share (EPS) in year t and 
the median analyst forecast of EPS for year t, is scaled by the firm’s stock price at the beginning 
of the year to facilitate comparison across firms (Lang and Lundholm 1996; Dhaliwal et al., 
2012). Y takes two values 0 and 2 to accommodate for short-term and long-term forecasts, for 
example FERROR0 corresponds to the next available year end and FERROR2 corresponds to 
the third-year ahead forecast.  
This paper also controls for financial opaqueness (ACC) at company level computed as 
the absolute value of a company’s total accruals to accommodate for the level of financial 
disclosures. Prior studies (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Hope, 2003; Dhaliwal et al., 2012) show 
that a higher level of financial transparency improves analysts’ forecast accuracy. Companies 
with high earnings opacity are expected to gain more useful information from non-financial 
disclosure in assessing their financial performance. Analysts will use such information to form 
the basis for their recommendations. The positive relationship between environmental 
disclosure and analysts’ recommendations is expected to be stronger among companies with a 
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lower level of financial opacity. Financial opacity (ACC) is measured by total accruals 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2003; Dhaliwal et al., 2012): 
ACCt  = (∆CAt − ∆CLt − ∆CASHt + ∆STDt − DEPt + ∆TPt) / TAt-1      (1) 
where: 
ACCt = total accruals for a company in year t; 
∆CAt = change in a company’s total current assets in year t;  
∆CLt = change in a company’s total current liabilities in year t; 
∆CASHt = change in a company’s cash in year t; 
∆STDt = change in a company’s current portion of long-term debt included in total current 
liabilities in year t;  
DEPt = depreciation and amortization expense for a company in year t;  
∆TPt = change in income taxes payable for a company in year t; and  
TAt-1 = total assets for a company in year t-1. 
Firm size and analyst coverage were included as proxies for firm visibility and 
information environment. Large firms disclose more because they are publicly visible (Watts 
and Zimmerman, 1983), and therefore subject to greater scrutiny and for similar reasons engage 
in greater CSR activities (Waddock and Graves, 1997; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010). For these 
reasons, firms are more likely to increase the volume and quality of disclosure. Alternatively, 
smaller firms seem to disclose less non-financial information compared to larger firms (Lang 
and Lundholm, 1993; Vanstraelen et al., 2003; Orens and Lybaert, 2010). Therefore, there will 
be higher financial coverage of larger firms with high accessibility to nonfinancial information 
(García-Meca and Martinez, 2007; Orens and Lybaert, 2007). Firm size (SIZE) is measured by 
the natural logarithm of total assets and is lagged by one year. Analysts’ coverage is a good 
proxy for information environment (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Healy et al., 1999; Khlif and 
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Souissi, 2010) and firm’s visibility (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010). Socially responsible firms 
attract socially conscious consumers (Hillman & Keim, 2001; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010), 
and ethical investors (Kapstein, 2001; Van de Velde et al., 2005) who are interested in 
supporting sustainable companies and pushing up financial value. It could also be the extent of 
analyst coverage as compared to their specialisation that affects analysts’ decisions on 
company value (Zuckerman, 1999; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010). Ertimur et al. (2007, p.583) 
argue that firms with higher analyst followings have greater information production which may 
affect analysts’ decisions due to higher competition between the analysts. Analysts’ coverage 
(ANALYST) is measured by the total number of analysts following the company.  
The paper includes firm-specific variables that have an impact on analysts’ 
recommendations and the environmental behaviour of a firm. Valuation ratios, one-year lagged 
earning-to-price ratio (ETP) and one-year lagged book-to-market ratio (BTM) are included. 
Higher valuation ratios are expected to be translated into more favourable recommendations 
(Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010; Jegadeesh et al., 2004). Profitability is another firm-specific 
variable that is measured by one-year lagged return on assets (ROA). It is a factor for firm 
resources which lead to strategies that must be disclosed i  order to be valorised in the form of 
favourable recommendations. Profitable firms can endure stakeholders’ pressure and afford the 
costs incurred from disclosure practices (Cormier and Magnan, 1999). Moreover, they attract 
more investors and gain their confidence (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). The paper also controls 
for intangibles (INT) and capital expenditure (EXP). Both variables are taken as a percentage 
of total assets and lagged by one year. Analysts’ recommendations capture the qualitative 
aspects of firms’ operations such as intangible assets, capital projects and investment 
opportunities (Jegadeesh et al., 2004, p.26). Thus, analysts are expected to issue favourable 
buy recommendations when firms are involved in different growth opportunities (Ioannou and 
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Serafeim, 2010). Finally, industry grouping based on the I/B/E/S industry sector classification 
(Appendix 2) is included in the model 
4.4.The regression model  
RECCONt = β0 + β1ENVDISCt-1 + β2ENVPERt-1+ β3ACCt-1 + β4FERRORY + β5ANALYSTt-
1 + β6SIZEt-1 + β7ETPt-1 + β8BTMt-1 + β9ROAt-1 + β10INTt-1 + β11EXPt-1 + β12IND + ε  
  (2) 
where: 
RECCON        the consensus (mean) investment recommendation for each company-year pair 
ENVDISC environmental disclosure aggregate score measured using the CONI approach. 
Two measures were used. First, QUALDISC, which is the highest recorded level achieved in 
step 2 of the CONI typology. Second, VOLDISC, which is the volumetric measure used as a 
proxy for total disclosures according to step 3 of the CONI approach. 
ENVPER   environmental performance measured as the ratio of recycled waste to total waste  
ACC total accruals as a measure of financial opaqueness. 
FERRORY  (Y= 0 or 2) i.e. FERROR0, and FERROR2 (reflecting short-term and long-term 
forecast horizon) = the company’s absolute value of average analyst forecast errors for 
forecasts made in year t for the earnings of year t+1, and t+3, respectively. 
ANALYST    total number of analysts following 
SIZE       natural log of total assets 
ETP          earning-to-price ratio  
BTM          book-to-market ratio  
ROA        return on assets  
INT            intangibles as a percentage of total assets  
EXP           capital expenditure as a percentage of total assets 
IND       industry dummy variable.  
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4.5.The innate and discretionary components of disclosure index  
Prior researchers (see for e.g. Francis et al., 2005; Kent et al., 2010) tend to assess accrual 
quality by separating accruals into innate and discretionary components arguing that there is 
unexplained portion of accruals that may offer an advantage in measuring accrual quality. The 
discretionary component measures managerial intentional behaviour while the innate 
component is related to the innate characteristics of accrual. This involves estimating a 
regression of accrual quality measure on innate company characteristics where the regression 
predicted values are the estimation of innate accrual quality and the residual values are the 
estimation of discretionary accrual quality. In an attempt to capture disclosure quality in a 
manner less confounded by innate characteristics than existing measures are, this study follows 
Francis et al.’s (2005) approach and argues that there is an unexplained portion of the variation 
in the disclosure levels which can be explained by residuals from the annual regression of 
environmental disclosure on disclosure determinants. The paper substitutes the actual 
disclosure scores currently employed (both in terms of quantity and quality) with the expected 
(innate) and discretionary components of disclosure. Based on the assumption that managers 
have intrinsic incentives which involve the existential, social and ecological values (Ims et al., 
2014) and could be opportunistic for the longer term goals (Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012), 
high quality environmental disclosures measured using a hierarchical scale (see also Beck et 
al., 2010) are more likely to be a strong predictor of managerial discretionary behaviour.   
The paper identifies firm-specific variables that determine corporate environmental 
disclosure, size, profit, listing status, leverage and industry which are consistent with prior 
literature (e.g., Hackston and Milne, 1996; Cormier and Magnan, 1999; Gray et al., 2001; 
Adams, 2002; Gao et al., 2005; Tagesson et al., 2009). It also identifies public exposure 
measured by proximity to end user and the level of information asymmetry measured by 
number of analyst following as determinates of environmental disclosure. Companies with 
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public exposure will disclose information of both high quality and volume to manage their 
legitimacy and public image. Public exposure could be assessed using proximity to end user, 
the public recognition of company names, or companies’ media exposure. In this paper, 
differences in environmental reporting correspond to public exposure proxied by proximity to 
end-user (Clarke and Gibson-Sweet, 1999). Financial analysts reduce information asymmetry 
by providing public information to market participants. High analysts following represents 
good information environment that will fasten the dissemination of information by market 
participants. Therefore, number of analyst following is also included as a determinant of 
corporate disclosures (see for e.g., Lundholm, 1996; Healy et al., 1999; Leuz, 2003; Roulstone, 
2003; Khanna et al., 2004; Khlif and Souissi, 2010). 
The paper relies on annual estimations of the model: 
 ENVDISCj,t = β0 + β1SIZEj,t + β2ROAj,t + β3CROSSLISTj,t + β4LEVj,t+ β5EXPOSUREj,t 
+β6ANALYSTj,t + β7INDj + εj,t  (3) 
Where SIZEj,t is the size of the firm j, calculated by natural logarithm of total assets, ROAj,t is 
the firm j profitability calculated by return on assets, CROSSLISTj,t is the firm j listing status 
calculated using a dummy variable equal to one for firms listed on more than one stock 
exchanges and zero otherwise, LEV is the firm j leverage calculated by debt to total assets ratio, 
EXPOSURE represents public exposure proxied by proximity to end user measured by taking 
a 1 to 3 score (those which are predominantly primary, secondary or tertiary in their activities) 
where the highest score was allocated to the group which was the closest to the final customer 
(i.e. tertiary sector companies)6. ANALYST is the total number of analysts following the firm, 
                                                            
6 The group closest to the end-user was defined as those companies that sell directly to final customer such as retailers and 
brewers; the second group includes companies providing products known to the final customer for example companies that 
are vertically integrated and consumer brands bear the company name such as petrochemicals, whilst the third group 
comprises those businesses with no overt link with end user, many of which are likely to be unknown to the end-user such as 
industrial gases and mining. 
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and INDj is firm j industry classification. The annual regression of environmental disclosure on 
disclosure determinants (innate factors) is performed for each of disclosure quality and volume. 
The predicted values from equation 3 yield an estimate of the innate portion of firm j’s 
environmental disclosure (quality and volume) in year t,  
INNATEQUALj,t = 
^
0 + 
^
1SIZEj,t + 
^
2ROAj,t + 
^
3CROSSLISTj,t + 
^
4LEVj,t+ 
^
5 EXPOSUREj,t+ 

^
6ANALYSTj,t + 
^
7INDj + ̂εj,t 
INNATEVOLj,t = 
^
0 + 
^
1SIZEj,t + 
^
2ROAj,t + 
^
3CROSSLISTj,t 
^
4LEVj,t+ 
^
5 EXPOSUREj,t+ 
^
6ANALYSTj,t + 
^
7INDj + ̂εj,t 
The residuals from equation 3 is the estimate of the discretionary component of firm j’s 
environmental disclosure (quality and volume) 
RESQUALj,t= ̂εj,t and RESVOLj,t= ̂εj,t 
5. Results and analysis  
5.1.Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The average mean of 
analyst recommendations is 2.598. This is lower than a mean of 3.652 in Ioannou and 
Serafeim’s (2010) study based on United States data. The mean for environmental disclosure 
volume score is 43.505. It ranges from 0 minimum score to 243 maximum score. The mean of 
qualitative disclosure score is 3.391 taking a 0-5 scale. These variations in environmental 
disclosures indicate that some companies show more interest than others in disclosing 
information about their environmental practices within public reports. Forecast error means for 
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short-term and long-term horizons are 0.035 and 0.097 respectively and the mean of 
environmental performance measure is 0.133. Descriptive statistics also show that the study 
sample includes companies with mean company size of 14.892 as measured by the natural 
logarithm of total assets with an average of 15 analysts following per company.  
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 reports the mean values of key variables by industry. Data show that companies 
from the energy sector (ENERGY) receive high consensus investment recommendations 
(2.721) with relatively high quality of environmental disclosure score (3.676) and high 
disclosure volume (3.815). Conversely, companies from the technology sector (TECHNOL) 
receive relatively unfavourable recommendations (2.454) with the lowest disclosure values, 
quality (3.400) and volume (3.615).  
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 presents pair-wise correlations among the variables used in the model. The 
correlation matrix shows that analysts are optimistic towards environmental disclosure quality 
where QUALDISC is positively correlated with mean analyst recommendations but not 
volume. In terms of control variables, FERROR is positively correlated with mean analyst 
recommendations (RECCON) while analyst following (ANALYST) and financial opaqueness 
(ACC) are negatively correlated with analyst recommendations (RECCON). Table 3 shows no 
correlation above 0.5 among the variables of interest, therefore multicollinearity in not an 
issue7.  
[Table 3 about here] 
                                                            
7 I also run the correlation matrix using innate and discretionary components of environmental disclosures along with other 
variables used in the model and it shows that multicollinearity is not an issue (no correlation above 0.5). 
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5.2.Regression results  
Table 4 models 1.1-1.5 present regression results for testing the impact of qualitative 
disclosure (QUALDISC) on analyst recommendations (RECCON) while Table 5 models 1.6-
1.10 present the regression results for testing the impact of disclosure volume. Models 1.1 and 
1.6 test the impact of disclosure quality and volume respectively on analyst recommendations 
after controlling for analyst short-term forecast error (FERROR0) and other control variables 
while models 1.2 and 1.7 test the impact of disclosure quality and volume respectively on 
analyst recommendations after controlling for analyst long-term forecast error (FERROR2) and 
other controls. Models 1.3 and 1.8 retest the models using innate and discretionary disclosure 
quality and volume respectively, both variables are included in the model. Models 1.4 and 1.9 
use only discretionary disclosure quality (RESQUAL) and discretionary disclosure volume 
(RESVOL) respectively, while models 1.5 and 1.10 use only the innate disclosure quality 
(INNATEQUAL) and innate disclosure volume (INNATEVOL) respectively8.  
Models 1.1 and 1.2 show that disclosure quality is positive and significant at (p<0.10) 
with analysts’ recommendations while disclosure volume tends to have no impact (models 1.6 
and 1.7), suggesting that analysts are more likely to give favourable recommendations to firms 
with qualitative disclosures that reflect real commitment in strategic long-term investments. 
Alternatively, narrative statements have no impact on analysts’ decisions. Results also suggest 
that in the presence of quality disclosure, the addition of mere quantity makes no difference to 
analyst forecast decisions (untabulated). The results are consistent with Ioannou and Serafeim’s 
(2010) and their argument vis-à-vis the impact of CSR on analyst recommendations. The CONI 
method applied in this paper assesses information to be of high quality based on 1-5 scale of 
ascending order of information adequacy where highest quality denotes information that 
                                                            
8 The paper controls for short-term forecast error in models (1.3-1.5) and (1.8-1.10). Results for controlling for long-term 
forecast error are untabulated but consistent with original models.  
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provides not only mere narrative statements but also some numerical details and comparable 
information. Such information will be easier to use in monitoring, benchmarking and ranking 
firms (Aerts et al., 2007). This study confirms the proposition that companies produce 
environmental disclosure as part of a communications strategy intended to offset criticism, 
control risk, and reassure investors.  
When substituting the actual disclosure scores (both of quality and volume) with innate 
and discretionary disclosures in models 1.3-1.5 and 1.8-1.10, results show only high quality 
discretionary disclosure is positive and significant at (p<0.05) with analyst recommendations. 
In other words, managerial discretionary behaviour which involves the disclosure of 
environmental information that is quantifiable, qualitative and allows comparison against 
target or trend is more likely to receive more favourable market reactions because analysts tend 
to perceive such disclosures as positive signals and therefore give favourable evaluation of 
companies with high disclosure quality. On the other hand, the volume of both innate and 
discretionary components has no impact on sell-side analyst decisions, suggesting that 
generalised statements that companies are expected to make anyway have no impact on analyst 
decisions.  
It is noteworthy that the positive coefficient of discretionary disclosure quality 
(RESQUAL) is significant at (p<0.05) in models 1.3 and 1.4 which is higher than the coefficient 
of total disclosure quality (QUALDISC) that is only significant at (p<0.10) in models 1.1 and 
1.2. This finding is consistent with the study hypotheses in which corporate environmental 
disclosure that is of high quality and influenced by managerial choices (discretionary) will help 
analysts to produce favourable recommendations while disclosure volume of both innate and 
discretionary components is not of value relevance. The study findings are in line with 
stewardship theory that explains managers need to be committed towards not only shareholders 
but also other stakeholders such as the natural environment and civic society (Francoeur et al., 
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2015). Managers could have an implicit social obligations that go beyond the economic 
exchange (Cuevas‐Rodríguez et al., 2012). They are moral actors (Wood, 1991) and their 
discretionary actions involve voluntary disclosure of social and environmental responsibility. 
Results support the argument behind different motives that shape managerial behaviour where 
existential, social and ecological values that influence managers’ commitment to ensure 
responsible business manner (Ims et al., 2014) are more likely to be translated into high quality 
disclosures. Where disclosures are based on quantification, for example specifying 
environmental performance or measuring performance against target, they have greater 
credibility in terms of building good image for environmental responsibility (Toms, 2002). The 
disclosure of high quality environmental information is more likely to attract universal 
investors (Stout, 2012) to buy stock in the firm. Moreover, analysts are more likely to pay 
attention to such information and factor it into stock recommendation since that environmental 
friendly behaviour adds value over the longer term and can be an interesting norm to back up 
an investment decision (Luo et al., 2015).  
A number of control variables, namely ACC, FERRORy, and BTM were also significant 
in these models. Firm-level financial opaqueness measure (ACC) is significant at (p<0.01) and 
negatively associated with analyst recommendations indicating that high quality environmental 
disclosure has a positive association with sell-side analyst and it compensates for the negative 
effect of financial opacity on analyst forecast decisions. Findings suggest that the extent of total 
accruals draws investors’ uncertainties regarding earnings and requires them to rely on other 
sources of information such as non-financial data. Analyst forecast errors for short-term 
forecast horizon (FERROR0) and long-term forecast horizon (FERROR2) are both positive and 
significant at (p<0.01) with sell-side analyst recommendations. Environmental performance 
measures (ENVPER) is positively associated with analyst recommendation but not significant 
and book-to-market ratio (BTM) is positive and significant at (p<0.10) with analyst 
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recommendations in most models. Analyst coverage as measured by the number of analysts 
following the company (ANALYST) is significant at (p<0.01) and negatively associated with 
analyst recommendations in all models except models 1.6 and 1.8 indicating that companies 
with a larger number of analyst following have greater information production and high 
competition among analysts which tends to impact on analyst decisions (Ertimur et al., 2007). 
Of the remaining control variables, I/B/E/S industry indicator variables are included in all 
models and were referred to earlier in the discussion of Table 2 that reflects analyst 
recommendations difference by industry sector classification.  
Overall the study findings are consistent with prior literature that examines how 
analysts form their expectations and the specific role different types of nonfinancial disclosures 
play in the foundation of these expectations (Vanstraelen et al., 2003; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2012). Findings are consistent with Eccles et al. (2011) argument that 
companies considering long-term strategies are more likely to devote greater effort and 
emphasis on the long-term investment in their communication with analysts and investors. 
[Table 4 & 5 about here] 
6. Conclusion  
This paper investigates the impact of quality/quantity environmental disclosure on 
analysts’ recommendations and finds that the quality of environmental information disclosed 
in companies’ annual reports tends to receive favourable buy recommendations. Moreover, 
discretionary quality disclosure that is influenced by managerial intervention receives 
favourable buy recommendations. The results show that non-financial information, 
environmental information in this regard, has the capacity to improve investment decisions. 
Specific, quantified, and comparable disclosures above mere generalised statements can help 
investors make more efficient investment decisions whereas mere volume of disclosure is 
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insufficient for effective signalling about environmental strategies. Results also show that 
financial opacity measured by total accrual is significant and negatively associated with analyst 
recommendations suggesting that the lower the level of financial opacity the more likely 
analysts will give favourable buy recommendations. The results show that financial analysts 
use information that is voluntarily disclosed by UK-listed companies and they have more 
accurate understanding of future performance when companies provide high quality 
information. Information that are mere narrative and do not reflect real substantive solutions to 
environmental challenges such as climate change and alternative energy supplies are not likely 
to be valued by investors. 
These findings have important implications in understanding the function of 
environmental disclosures in the UK financial markets. The market has its own reaction and 
imposes its own penalties as investors’ appetite grows for non-financial information such as 
issues related to climate change threats and the depletion of natural resources that have an 
impact on business operations. These findings also have implications for corporations seeking 
to engage in more sustainable strategies showing that more disclosures that are quantifiable, 
qualitative and provide with comparison against target are needed in order to receive favourable 
market reactions. It is noteworthy that the disclosure of non-financial information in 
companies’ annual reports and the impact this may have on analysts’ decisions is of interest to 
corporate managers (Orens and Lybaert, 2007) who may have an implicit social obligations 
that go beyond the economic benefits.  
The paper responds to calls for more research into how analysts use non-financial data, 
such as environmental data when making recommendation (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2010; 
Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2012). This requires more research to be undertaken on 
how valuation models can be developed that meaningfully incorporate non-financial 
information, and how recommendation changes are driven by new information. The innate and 
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discretionary approach of environmental disclosure used in this paper appears to be novel and 
requires further investigation. Further research could also use a different measure to assess 
environmental performance, for e.g. a comprehensive indicator of a firm’s total environmental 
performance (Dixon et al., 2014). The study uses the recycled waste ratio as a proxy for 
evaluating environmental performance which reflects the observable and quantifiable results 
of a firm’s internal efforts to address environmental issues (Endrikat et al., 2014). Therefore a 
combination of quantitative indicators and qualitative indicators could be helpful. Moreover, 
further research might examine the impact of the quality of specific environmental disclosures 
such as CO2 emission, or other classes of voluntary, non-financial information, on a more 
recent dataset and in different international settings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Page 27 of 41 Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
28 
 
References 
 
Adams, C. A. (2002). Internal organisational factors influencing corporate social and ethical 
reporting: beyond current theorising. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 
15(2), 223-250. 
Aerts, W., Cormier, D., & Magnan, M. (2007). The association between web‐based corporate 
performance disclosure and financial analyst behaviour under different governance 
regimes. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(6), 1301-1329. 
Ahmed, K., & Courtis, J. K. (1999). Associations between corporate characteristics and 
disclosure levels in annual reports: A Meta-Analysis. The British Accounting Review, 
31(1), 35-61. 
Albertini, E. (2014). A descriptive analysis of environmental disclosure: A longitudinal study 
of French companies. Journal of business ethics, 121(2), 233-254. 
Al-Shaer, H., Salama, A., & Toms, S. (2017). Audit committees and financial reporting quality: 
evidence from UK environmental accounting disclosures. Journal of Applied 
Accounting Research, 18(1). 
Al-Tuwaijri, S. A., Christensen, T. E., & Hughes II, K. E. (2004). The relations among 
environmental disclosure, environmental performance, and economic performance: a 
simultaneous equations approach. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29(5), 447-
471. 
Ball, R., Robin, A., & Wu, J. (2003). Incentives versus standards: properties of accounting 
income in four East Asian countries. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 36(1), 235–
270. 
Beck, A., Campbell, D., & Shrives, P. (2010). Content analysis in environmental reporting 
research: enrichment and rehearsal of the method in a British–German context. British 
Accounting Review, 42(3), 207-222. 
Bhat, G., Hope, O. K., & Kang, T., (2006). Does corporate governance transparency affect the 
accuracy of analyst forecasts? Accounting & Finance, 46(5), 715-732. 
Bhattacharya, U., Daouk, H., & Welker, M. (2003). The world price of earnings opacity. 
Accounting Review, 78(3), 641–678. 
Botosan, C. A. (1997). Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. Accounting Review, 323-
349. 
Bradshaw, M. T. (2004). How do analysts use their earnings forecasts in generating stock 
recommendations? Accounting Review, 79(1), 25-50. 
Breton, G., & Taffler, R. J. (2001). Accounting information and analyst stock recommendation 
decisions: a content analysis approach. Accounting and Business Research, 31(2), 91-
101. 
Byard, D., Li, Y., & Weintrop, J. (2006). Corporate governance and the quality of financial 
analysts’ information. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 25 (5), 609-625. 
Campbell, D. (2003). Intra- and intersectoral effects in environmental disclosures: evidence for 
legitimacy theory?. Business Strategy and the Environment, 12 (6), 357–371. 
Campbell, D., Moore, G., & Shrives, P. (2006). Cross-sectional effects in community 
disclosure. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 19(1), 96-114. 
Campbell, D., & Abdul Rahman, M. (2010). A longitudinal examination of intellectual capital 
reporting in Marks & Spencer annual reports, 1978–2008. British Accounting Review, 
42(1), 56-70. 
Capstaff, J., Paudyal, K., & Rees, W. (2000). Revisions of earnings forecasts and security 
returns: evidence from three countries. Department of Accounting and Finance, 
University of Glasgow.  
Page 28 of 41Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
29 
 
Chan, M. C., Watson, J., & Woodliff, D. (2014). Corporate governance quality and CSR 
disclosures. Journal of Business Ethics, 125(1), 59-73. 
Chang, L., & Wee, M. (2014). How does investor relations disclosure affect analysts’ 
forecasts? Accounting and Finance, 54(2), 365–391. 
Cheng, B., Ioannou, I., & Serafeim, G. (2014). Corporate social responsibility and access to 
finance. Strategic Management Journal, 35(1), 1-23. 
Clarke, J., & Gibson-Sweet, M. (1999). The use of corporate social disclosures in the 
management of reputation and legitimacy. Business Ethics: A European Review, 8(1), 
5–13. 
Clarkson, P.M., Li, Y., Richardson, G.D. & Vasvari, F.P. (2008). Revisiting the relation 
between environmental performance and environmental disclosure: An empirical 
analysis. Accounting, organizations and society, 33(4), 303-327. 
Cohen, D. A. (2003). Quality of financial reporting choice: determinants and economic 
consequences. Available at SSRN 422581. 
Connor, M. (September 10, 2010). More Wall Street analysts buy corporate social 
responsibility. Business Ethics. The Magazine of Corporate Responsibility. Retrieved 
form: http://business-ethics.com/2010/09/10/1311-study-more-wall-street-analysts-
buy-corporate-social-responsibility/ 
Cormier, D., & Magnan, M. (1999). Corporate environmental disclosure strategies: 
determinants, costs and benefits. Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance, 14(4), 
429-451. 
Cuevas‐Rodríguez, G., Gomez‐Mejia, L.R., & Wiseman, R.M. (2012). Has agency theory run 
its course?: Making the theory more flexible to inform the management of reward 
systems. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20(6), pp.526-546. 
Davis, J., Schoorman, F., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of 
management. The Academy of Management Review, 22(1), 20–47. 
Dechow, P., & Dichev, I. (2002). The quality of accruals and earnings: the role of accrual 
estimation errors. Accounting Review, 77 (s-1), 35–59. 
Deegan C. & Gordon B. (1996). A study of the environmental disclosures practices of 
Australian corporations. Accounting and Business Research, 26(3), 187–199. 
Delmas, M., & Burbano, V. (2011). The drivers of greenwashing. California Management 
Review, 54(1), 64. 
De Villiers, C., & Van Staden, C. (2011). Where firms choose to disclose voluntary 
environmental information. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 30(6), 504-525. 
Dhaliwal, D., Radhakrishnan, S., Tsang, A., & Yang, Y. (2012). Nonfinancial disclosure and 
analyst forecast accuracy: International evidence on corporate social responsibility 
disclosure. Accounting Review, 87(3), 723-759. 
Dhaliwal, D., Li, O.,Tsang. A., & Yang, G. (2011). Voluntary nonfinancial disclosure and the 
cost of equity capital: The initiation of corporate social responsibility reporting. 
Accounting Review, 86(1), 59–100. 
Dixon-Fowler, H.R., Slater, D.J., Johnson, J.L., Ellstrand, A.E. & Romi, A.M. (2013). Beyond 
“does it pay to be green?” A meta-analysis of moderators of the CEP–CFP 
relationship. Journal of business ethics, 112(2), 353-366. 
Dorestani, A., & Rezaee, Z. (2011). Key performance indicators and analysts’ earnings forecast 
accuracy: an application of content analysis. Asian Academy of Management Journal 
of Accounting and Finance, 7(2), 79-102. 
Eccles, R. G., Ioannou, I., & Serafeim, G. (2014). The impact of corporate sustainability on 
organizational processes and performance. Management Science, 60(11), 2835-2857. 
Page 29 of 41 Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
30 
 
Eccles, R. G., Ioannou, I., & Serafeim, G. (2012). The impact of a corporate culture of 
sustainability on corporate behavior and performance (No. W17950). National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
Eccles, R. G., Krzus, M. P., & Serafeim, G. (2011). Market Interest in Nonfinancial 
Information. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 23(4), 113-127. 
Endrikat, J., Guenther, E. & Hoppe, H. (2014). Making sense of conflicting empirical findings: 
A meta-analytic review of the relationship between corporate environmental and 
financial performance. European Management Journal, 32(5), 735-751. 
Ertimur, Y., Sunder, J., & Sunder, S. V. (2007). Measure for measure: the relation between 
forecast accuracy and recommendation profitability of analysts. Journal of Accounting 
Research, 45(3), 567-606. 
Fehr, E. & Falk, A. (2002). Psychological foundations of incentives. European economic 
review, 46(4), 687-724. 
Francis, J., LaFond, R., Olsson, P., & Schipper, K. (2005). The market pricing of accruals 
quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39(2), 295-327. 
Francis J., & Soffer, L. (1997). The relative informativeness of analysts’ stock 
recommendations and earnings forecast revisions. Journal of Accounting Research, 
35(2), 193-211. 
Frankel, R., Kothari, S., & Weber, J. (2006).  Determinants of the informativeness of analyst 
research. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 41(1), 29-54. 
Francoeur, C., Melis, A., Gaia, S., & Aresu, S. (2015). Green or greed? An alternative look at 
CEO compensation and corporate environmental commitment. Journal of Business 
Ethics, 1-15. 
Gao, S. S., Heravi, S., & Xiao, J. Z. (2005). Determinants of corporate social and environmental 
reporting in Hong Kong: A research note. Accounting Forum, 29(2), 233-242. 
García-Meca, E., & Martínez, I. (2007). The use of intellectual capital information in 
investment decisions: an empirical study using analyst reports. International Journal of 
Accounting, 42(1), 57–81. 
Garcia-Meca, E., & Sanchez-Ballesta, J. (2006). Influences on financial analyst forecast errors: 
a Meta-Analysis. International Business Review, 15(1), 29–52. 
Gray R, Kouhy R. & Lavers S. (1995). Corporate social and environmental reporting. A review 
of the literature and a longitudinal study of UK disclosures. Accounting, Auditing and 
Accountability Journal, 8(2), 47–77. 
Gray, R., Javad, M., Power, D. M., & Sinclair, C. D. (2001). Social and environmental 
disclosure and corporate characteristics: a research note and extension. Journal of 
Business Finance & Accounting, 28(3-4), 327-356. 
Guay, W., Kothari, S.P., & Watts, R. (1996). A market-based evaluation of discretionary 
accrual models. Journal of Accounting Research, 34 (s-1), 83–105. 
Hackston, D., & Milne, M. J. (1996). Some determinants of social and environmental 
disclosures in New Zealand companies. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability 
Journal, 9(1), 77-108. 
Healy, P., & Palepu, K. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital 
markets: a review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 31(1), 405-440. 
Healy, P. M., Hutton, A. P., & Palepu, K. G. (1999). Stock performance and intermediation 
changes surrounding sustained increases in disclosure. Contemporary Accounting 
Research, 16(3), 485−520. 
Hillman, A. J., & Keim, G. D. (2001). Shareholder value, stakeholder management, and social 
issues: what’s the bottom line? Strategic Management Journal, 22(2), 125-139. 
Page 30 of 41Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
31 
 
Ho, S. S. M., & Wong, K. S. (2004). Investment analysts’ usage and perceived usefulness of 
corporate annual reports. Corporate Ownership & Control, 1(3), 61−71. 
Hope, K. (2003). Disclosure practices, enforcement of accounting standards, and analysts’ 
forecast accuracy: An international study. Journal of Accounting Research, 41(2), 235-
272. 
Ims, K.J., Pedersen, L.J.T. & Zsolnai, L. (2014). How economic incentives may destroy social, 
ecological and existential values: The case of executive compensation. Journal of 
business ethics, 123(2), 353-360. 
Ioannou, I., & Serafeim, G. (2010). The impact of corporate social responsibility on investment 
recommendations. Academy of Management Proceedings, 1-46. 
Jegadeesh, N., Kim, J., Krische, S. D., & Lee C. (2004). Analyzing the analysts: When do 
recommendations add value? Journal of Finance, 59(3), 1083-1124. 
Jensen, M.C. & Meckling, W.H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs 
and ownership structure. Journal of financial economics, 3(4), 305-360. 
Jo, H., & Harjoto, M. A. (2012). The causal effect of corporate governance on corporate social 
responsibility. Journal of Business Ethics, 106(1), 53-72. 
Jones, T. M. (1995). Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and economics. 
Academy of Management Review, 20(2), 404-437. 
Kapstein, E. B. (2001). The corporate ethics crusade. Foreign Affairs, 80(5), 105-119. 
Kent, P., Routledge, J. and Stewart, J. (2010). Innate and discretionary accruals quality and 
corporate governance. Accounting & Finance, 50(1), 171-195. 
Khanna, T., Palepu, K. G., & Srinivasan, S. (2004). Disclosure practices of foreign companies 
interacting with US markets, Journal of Accounting Research, 42(2), 475–508. 
Khlif, H. & Souissi, M. (2010). The determinants of corporate disclosure: a meta-analysis. 
International Journal of Accounting & Information Management, 18(3),198-219. 
King, A., & Lenox, M. (2002). Exploring the locus of profitable pollution reduction. 
Management Science, 48(2), 289-299. 
Klettke, T. (2014). New determinants of analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy. Springer Science 
& Business. 
Kolk, A. (1999). Evaluating corporate environmen al reporting. Business Strategy & the 
Environment (John Wiley & Sons, Inc), 8(1), 225-237. 
Knutson, P. (1992). Financial reporting in the 1990s and beyond. New York, NY: 
Association for Investment Management and Research. 
Krippendorff, K. (1980). Content analysis: an introduction to its methodology. Sage 
Publications, London. 
Lang, M. H., & Lundholm, R. J. (2000). Voluntary disclosure and equity offerings: Reducing 
information asymmetry or hyping the stock? Contemporary Accounting Research, 
17(4), 623−662. 
Lang, M., & Lundholm, R. (1996). Corporate disclosure policy and analyst behaviour. 
Accounting Review, 71 (4), 467–493. 
Lang, M., & Lundholm, R. (1993). Cross-sectional determinants of analyst ratings of corporate 
disclosures. Journal of Accounting Research, 31(1), 246-71. 
Leuz, C. (2003).  IAS versus USGAAP: Information asymmetry-based evidence from 
Germany’s new market, Journal of Accounting Research, 41(3), 445–472. 
Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2005). Firms’ capital allocation choices, information quality, 
and the cost of capital. Information Quality, and the Cost of Capital (January 2005). 
Loh, R. K., & Mian, G. M. (2006). Do accurate earnings forecasts facilitate superior investment 
recommendations? Journal of Financial Economics, 80(2), 455-483. 
Page 31 of 41 Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
32 
 
Luo, X., Wang, H., Raithel, S. & Zheng, Q. (2015). Corporate social performance, analyst stock 
recommendations, and firm future returns. Strategic Management Journal, 36(1), 123-
136. 
Lyon, T., & Maxwell, J. (2011). Greenwash: corporate environmental disclosure under threat 
of audit. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 20(1), 3-41. 
Marquis, C., & Toffel, M. (2012). When do firms greenwash? Corporate visibility, civil society 
scrutiny, and environmental disclosure. Harvard Business School, 11-115.  
Orens, F., & Lybaert, N. (2010). Determinants of sell‐side financial analysts’ use of non‐
financial information. Accounting and Business Research, 40(1), 39-53. 
Orens, R., & Lybaert, N. (2007). Does the financial analysts’ usage of non-financial 
information influence the analysts’ forecast accuracy? Some evidence from the Belgian 
sell-side financial analyst. International Journal of Accounting, 42(3), 237-271. 
Patten, D. M. (1991). Exposure, legitimacy, and social disclosure. Journal of accounting and 
public policy, 10(4), 297-308. 
Peek, E. (1997). Earnings forecasting research: an overview and critique. Working paper, Vrije 
Universiteit, Amsterdam, 1997. 
Previts, J., Bricker, R., Robinson, T., & Young, S. (1994). A content analysis of sell-side 
financial analysts company reports. Accounting Horizons, 8(2), 55-70. 
Robertson, D. C., & Nicholson, N. (1996). Expressions of corporate social responsibility in 
UK firms. Journal of Business Ethics, 15(10), 1095-1106. 
Rogers, R. K., & Grant, J. (1997). Content analysis of information cited in reports of sell-side 
financial analysts. Journal of Financial Statement Analysis, 3(l), 17-30. 
Roulstone, D. T. (2003). The relation between insider-trading restrictions and executive 
compensation. Journal of Accounting Research, 41, 525– 551. 
Schipper, K. (1991). Commentary on analysts’ forecasts. Accounting Horizons, 5 (December), 
105-121. 
Simpson, A. (2010). Analysts’ use of nonfinancial information disclosures. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 27(1), 249-288. 
Spence, C. (2009). Social and environmental reporting and the corporate ego. Business Strategy 
and the Environment, 18(4), 254–265. 
Steiner, E. (March 29, 2012). Impact investing: finding resources for CSR start-ups. Business 
Ethics. The Magazine of Corporate Responsibility. Retrieved form: http://business-
ethics.com/2012/03/29/9325-impact-investing-finding-resources-for-csr-start-ups/ 
Stoner, T. H., & Backlund, P. (January 8, 2014). The most important climate change question: 
how will investors react? Business Ethics. The Magazine of Corporate Responsibility. 
Retrieved from: http://business-ethics.com/2014/01/08/1607-the-most-important-
climate-change-question-how-will-investors-react/ 
Stout, L.A. (2012). The shareholder value myth: How putting shareholders first harms 
investors, corporations, and the public. Berrett-Koehler Publishers. 
Subramanyam, K. R. (1996). The pricing of discretionary accruals. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 22(1), 249–281. 
Tagesson, T., Blank, V., Broberg, P., & Collin, S. O. (2009). What explains the extent and 
content of social and environmental disclosures on corporate websites: a study of social 
and environmental reporting in Swedish listed corporations. Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Environmental Management, 16(6), 352-364. 
Toms, J. S. (2002). Firm resources, quality signals and the determinants of corporate 
environmental reputation: some UK evidence. The British Accounting Review, 34(3), 
257-282. 
Page 32 of 41Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
33 
 
Van De Velde, E., Vermeir, W., & Corten, F. (2005). Corporate social responsibility and 
financial performance. Corporate Governance: The international journal of business 
society, 5(3), 129 - 138. 
Vanstraelen, A., Zarzeski, M., & Robb, S. (2003). Corporate nonfinancial disclosure practices 
and financial analyst forecast ability across three European countries. Journal of 
International Financial Management & Accounting, 14(3), 249-278. 
Waddock, S., & Graves, S. (1997). The Corporate Social Performance – Financial Performance 
Link. Strategic Management Journal, 18(4), 303–319. 
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1983). Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the 
Firm: Some Evidence. Journal of law and Economics, 26(1), 613-633. 
Wilmshurst, D.W., & Frost, G.R. (2000). Corporate environmental reporting. A test of 
legitimacy theory. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 13(1), 10–26. 
Wiseman, J. (1982). An evaluation of environmental disclosures made in corporate annual 
reports. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 7(1), 53-63. 
Wood, D. (1991). Corporate social performance revisited. Academy of Management Review, 
16(4), 691–718. 
Zuckerman, E. W. (1999). The Categorical Imperative: Securities Analysts and the Illegitimacy 
Discount. American Journal of Sociology, 104(5), 1398-1438. 
Page 33 of 41 Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting34  
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Regression Variables  
 
*Denotes innate factors  
RECCON = the consensus (i.e. mean) investment recommendation (Mean Analysts’ Recommendation) for each firm i in year t+1; QUALDISC = qualitative measure of disclosure based on 5 
types Scale; VOLDISC = quantitative measure of disclosure based on phrase count;  ENVPER= the percentage of total waste generated that is recycled; ACC = total accruals as a measure of 
financial opacity; FERRORY; (Y = 0 or 2) i.e. FERROR0, and FERROR2  = the firm’s absolute value of average analyst forecast errors for forecasts made in year t for the earnings of year t+1, 
and t+3, respectively; ANALYST = number of analysts following; SIZE = natural log of total asset; ETP = earnings over price; BTM =book value over market value of equity; ROA = return on 
assets; INT = intangibles (% of total assets); EXP = capital expenditure (% of total assets); CROSSLIST = a dummy variable takes the value of ‘1’ if the firm is listed on more than one stock exchanges and 
‘0’ otherwise; LEV = debt to asset ratio; EXPOSURE= taking a score 1 to 3 based on their link with final customer.  
Variable  RECCON QUALDISC VOLDISC ENVPER  ACC FERROR0 FERROR2 ANALYST* SIZE* ETP BTM ROA* INT EXP CROSSLIST* LEV* EXPOSURE* 
Mean  2.598 3.391 43.505 0.133 -0.216 0.035 0.097 15.120 14.892 0.086 0.558 8.568 0.215 5.065 0.840 0.217 2.278 
Median  2.640 4.00 36.00 0.000 -0.032 0.006 0.028 15.00 14.543 0.068 0.413 7.480 0.146 3.450 1.000 0.188 2.000 
SD 0.480 1.435 35.722 0.242 0.159 0.093 0.283 6.751 1.799 0.067 0.527 9.256 0.211 5.393 0.366 0.175 0.704 
Min 1.000 0.000 0.00 0.000 -1.255 0.0007 0.0001 1.000 11.772 0.006 -0.065 -21.720 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Max 3.750 5.00 243.00 0.907 0.266 0.732 1.755 38.00 21.095 0.454 3.333 46.750 0.811 28.02 1.000 0.704 3.000 
Skewness -0.454 -0.762 1.785 1.728 -5.043 5.104 5.440 0.351 1.166 2.953 2.481 0.928 0.871 1.914 -1.860 0.673 -0.451 
Kurtosis  3.956 2.222 7.206 4.662 36.837 31.876 37.322 2.917 4.534 14.291 11.652 7.292 2.867 7.178 4.460 2.747 2.080 
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Table 2 Descriptive Statistics by Industry (Mean Values) 
 
 
 
Variables are as defined in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable  RECCON QUALDISC VOLDISC ENVPER ACC FERROR0 FERROR2 ANALYST SIZE ETP BTM ROA INT EXP 
BASIC  2.630 3.721 4.026 0.151 -0.274 0.022 0.022 16.169 14.846 0.036 0.546 0.352 0.579 5.689 
CAPITAL  2.670 3.765 3.714 0.134 -0.563 0.055 0.057 16.758 14.505 0.130 0.724 0.257 0.551 4.578 
CONSDUR 2.416 4.600 4.200 0.007 0.019 0.015 0.015 17.000 13.150 0.204 0.364 0.210 0.219 6.262 
CONSND 2.591 3.566 3.466 0.155 -0.122 0.036 0.041 16.133 14.969 0.071 0.599 0.643 0.767 5.617 
CONSSVC 2.617 3.608 3.495 0.125 -0.105 0.035 0.037 16.551 14.392 0.111 0.609 0.352 0.723 4.846 
ENERGY 2.721 3.676 3.815 0.209 -0.042 0.013 0.013 14.156 15.271 0.099 0.777 0.456 0.417 4.352 
FINANCE 2.527 2.469 2.608 0.110 -0.047 0.044 0.044 15.387 15.799 0.070 0.505 0.112 0.481 5.241 
HEALTH 2.499 3.24 3.400 0.186 -0.023 0.002 0.002 15.625 15.197 0.077 0.681 0.195 0.450 4.934 
TECHNOL 2.454 3.400 3.615 0.111 -0.611 0.028 0.014 16.546 13.909 0.074 0.634 0.503 0.529 4.836 
TRANS 2.695 3.840 3.440 0.125 -0.042 0.068 0.066 15.840 14.347 0.190 0.394 0.922 0.218 5.829 
UTILITY 2.568 4.030 3.600 0.111 -0.267 0.011 0.011 17.633 15.766 0.105 0.768 0.181 0.815 6.380 
Page 35 of 41 Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Journal of Financial Reporting and Accounting36  
Table 3 Correlation Matrix 
 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 10.00 11.00 12.00 13.00 14.00 15.00 16.00 17.00 18.00 19.00 20.00 21.00 22.00 23.00 24.00 
RECCON 1.00                        
QUALDISC 0.03** 1.00                       
VOLDISC 0.03 0.64*** 1.00                      
ENVPER 0.01 0.05 0.01 1.00                     
ACC -0.05* -0.04 -0.04 0.02 1.00                    
ERROR0 0.09*** -0.08** -0.05* -0.06** 0.01 1.00                   
ANALYST -0.14** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.04 -0.07** -0.08** 1.00                  
SIZE -0.04 0.01 -0.10 0.06*** 0.10*** -0.12 0.23*** 1.00                 
ETP 0.04 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.02 0.01 0.02** 0.07*** 0.18*** 1.00                
BTM 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 0.02 0.04 -0.03 -0.04 0.18*** 0.60*** 1.00               
ROA 0.05 -0.02 0.05* 0.02 -0.18** 0.05 -0.04 -0.30 -0.25 -0.33 1.00              
INT -0.04 0.10*** 0.07*** 0.04 0.02 -0.08** 0.11*** -0.14** -0.07** -0.14** -0.01 1.00             
EXP 0.8** -0.01 0.08*** -0.03 0.01 -0.04 -0.07** -0.07** -0.20** -0.11** 0.01 -0.15** 1.00            
BASIC 0.02 0.08*** 0.21*** -0.02 0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.10 0.22*** 1.00           
CAPITAL 0.06** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.01 -0.01 0.09*** 0.10*** -0.17** 0.11*** 0.09*** -0.04 0.09*** -0.09** -0.16** 1.00          
CONSDUR -0.03 0.05** 0.05** -0.05 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.03 -0.03 0.03 0.08*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 1.00         
CONSND 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.12*** -0.04 -0.06** 0.00 0.10*** -0.01 -0.11** -0.14** -0.02 1.00        
CONSSVC 0.02 0.07*** 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.05** -0.04 -0.09** -0.13** 0.12*** 0.17*** 0.00 -0.18 -0.24 -0.04 -0.16 1.00       
ENERGY 0.06** 0.05 0.10*** 0.07 0.02 -0.06** 0.09*** 0.14*** -0.06** -0.06** 0.05** -0.08** 0.08*** -0.09 -0.11 -0.02 -0.08 -0.14 1.00      
FINANCE -0.08** -0.34** -0.43** -0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.25** 0.03 0.09*** 0.21*** -0.20** -0.37** -0.12** -0.18** -0.24** -0.04 -0.16** -0.28** -0.14** 1.00     
HEALTH -0.03 -0.02 0.00 0.05 0.01 -0.06** -0.05 0.17*** -0.06** -0.07** 0.06*** 0.09*** -0.01 -0.05** -0.07** -0.01 -0.05 -0.08** -0.04** -0.08 1.00    
TECHNOL -0.08** 0.00 0.05 -0.02 -0.15** -0.06** 0.05 -0.15 -0.09** -0.09** 0.15*** 0.16*** -0.07** -0.09** -0.11** -0.02 -0.08** -0.14** -0.07** -0.14** -0.04 1.00   
TRANS 0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.05** -0.01 -0.05** 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.05** -0.07** -0.01 -0.05 -0.08** -0.04 -0.08** -0.02 -0.04 1.00  
UTILITY -0.01 0.07*** 0.03 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.03 0.12*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.07** 0.01 0.03 -0.06** -0.08** -0.01 -0.05** -0.09** -0.04 -0.09** -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 1.00 
Variables are as defined in Table 1. 
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Table 4 The Impact of Environmental Disclosure Quality on Analysts’ Recommendations 
RECCON 
Variable  coef coef coef coef coef 
 Model (1.1) Model (1.2) Model (1.3) Model (1.4) Model (1.5) 
QUALDISC 0.019* 
(1.79) 
0.016* 
(1.51) 
   
INNATEQUAL   -0.005 
(-0.01) 
 -0.007 
(-0.02) 
RESQUAL   0.024** 
(2.15) 
0.024** 
(1.97) 
 
ENVPER 
 
0.070 
(1.42) 
0.070 
(1.42) 
0.068 
(1.45) 
0.070 
(1.42) 
0.070 
(1.42) 
ACC -0.008*** 
(-6.32) 
-0.008*** 
(-6.32) 
-0.008*** 
(-6.32) 
-0.008*** 
(-6.23) 
-0.008*** 
(-6.32) 
FERROR0 0.578*** 
(3.31) 
 0.583*** 
(3.33) 
0.571*** 
(3.76) 
0.546*** 
(3.51) 
FERROR2  0.162** 
(2.36) 
   
ANALYST -0.166*** 
(-4.48) 
-0.168*** 
(-4.25) 
-0.161*** 
(-3.86) 
-0.161*** 
(-3.87) 
-0.159*** 
(-3.76) 
SIZE 0.016 
(1.04) 
0.014 
(0.92) 
0.105 
(0.39) 
0.018 
(1.15) 
0.121 
(0.43) 
ETP 0.006 
(0.02) 
0.017 
(0.06) 
-0.002 
(-0.01) 
-0.006 
(-0.02) 
0.071 
(0.23) 
BTM 0.042* 
(1.54) 
0.044* 
(1.58) 
0.042* 
(1.54) 
0.046** 
(2.08) 
0.041* 
(1.89) 
ROA 0.002 
(0.87) 
0.001 
(0.70) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.002 
(0.89) 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
INT -0.083 
(-0.71) 
-0.101 
(-0.85) 
-0.072 
(-0.60) 
-0.072 
(-0.60) 
-0.068 
(-0.56) 
EXP -0.001 
(-0.31) 
-0.001 
(-0.27) 
-0.001 
(-0.23) 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
IND Included  Included Included Included Included 
Constant  2.603*** 
(9.60) 
2.654*** 
(9.79) 
2.654*** 
(9.84) 
2.727*** 
(10.48) 
2.164*** 
(3.28) 
Prob > Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 885 885 885 885 885 
R-square 0.086 0.075 0.090 0.087 0.091 
Hausman Test 14.67 22.02 14.61 13.42 13.81 
VIF max 4.21 4.21 1.72 1.72 1.67 
VIF ave 1.58 1.58 1.28 1.23 1.40 
 
Variables are as defined in Table 1. 
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Table 5 The Impact of Environmental Disclosure Volume on Analysts’ Recommendations 
RECCON 
Variable  coef coef coef coef coef 
 Model (1.6) Model (1.7) Model (1.8) Model (1.9) Model (1.10) 
VOLDISC 0.011 
(0.67) 
0.011 
(0.50) 
   
INNATEVOL   -0.023 
(-0.02) 
 -0.024 
(-0.02) 
RESVOL   0.016 
(0.83) 
0.021 
(0.88) 
 
ENVPER 
 
0.070 
(1.45) 
0.070 
(1.45) 
0.070 
(1.45) 
0.070 
(1.46) 
0.070 
(1.42) 
ACC -0.008*** 
(-6.31) 
-0.008*** 
(6.31) 
-0.008*** 
(-6.31) 
-0.008*** 
(-6.32) 
-0.008*** 
(-6.31) 
FERROR0 0.563*** 
(3.22) 
 0.122*** 
(2.57) 
0.553*** 
(3.61) 
0.545*** 
(3.51) 
FERROR2 -0.164*** 
(-4.43) 
0.162*** 
(2.59) 
-0.167*** 
(-4.51) 
  
ANALYST 0.016 
(1.04) 
-0.162*** 
(-3.85) 
-0.014 
(-0.36) 
-0.161*** 
(-3.82) 
-0.159*** 
(-3.76) 
SIZE 0.043 
(0.15) 
0.015 
(0.96) 
0.048 
(0.17) 
0.017 
(1.08) 
0.018 
(0.41) 
ETP 0.040 
(1.45) 
0.046 
(0.15) 
0.041 
(1.48) 
0.032 
(0.11) 
0.066 
(0.22) 
BTM 0.001 
(0.78) 
0.044** 
(1.97) 
0.004 
(0.98) 
0.043* 
(1.95) 
0.042* 
(1.94) 
ROA -0.081 
(-0.69) 
0.001 
(0.69) 
-0.094 
(-0.79) 
0.001 
(0.81) 
0.001 
(0.30) 
INT -0.001 
(-0.37) 
-0.084 
(-0.67) 
-0.001 
(-0.29) 
-0.071 
(-0.58) 
-0.067 
(-0.56) 
EXP 0.005 
(0.96) 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
0.001 
(1.03) 
-0.001 
(0.29) 
-0.001 
(-0.23) 
IND Included  Included Included Included Included 
Constant  2.616*** 
(9.47) 
2.736*** 
(10.07) 
2.926 
(0.70) 
2.741*** 
(10.50) 
2.922 
(0.71) 
Prob Chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 885 885 885 885 885 
R-square 0.087 0.079 0.081 0.080 0.081 
Hausman Test 14.22 20.49 15.59 16.14 13.75 
VIF max 4.21 4.21 1.71 1.71 1.71 
VIF ave 1.90 1.90 1.29 1.26 1.31 
 
Variables are as defined in Table 1. 
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Appendix 1 
Categories Used In CONI Method 
 
   Note: Adapted from Beck et al. (2010, pp.218-219).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Category 
 
Definition 
 
 
GEN 
 
 
RES 
 
POLL 
 
SUSTAIN 
 
LIAB  
 
ACT 
 
BRR 
 
PRESS 
 
SER 
 
ENE 
 
IRP 
 
 
 
 
General environmental related disclosures: any mention dealing with environmental policy 
and concern for the environment 
 
Who is responsible for the implementation and the environmental behaviour?  
 
Pollution related disclosure  
 
Disclosure related to sustainability  
 
Environmental liabilities  
 
Environment-related activities  
 
Business related risk  
 
Pressure groups  
 
Separate environmental report 
 
Energy related disclosure  
 
Information retrieval process to obtain feedback from stakeholders  
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Appendix 2 
IBES Industry IBES Sectors 
Sector I/B/E/S Code Sector mnemonic 
appearing in datatype  
Sector description 
1 FINANCE  Finance 
2 HEALTH  Health 
3 CONSNO  Consumer non-durables 
4 CONSSVC  Consumer services 
5 CONSDUR  Consumer durables 
6 ENERGY  Energy 
7 TRANSP  Transportation 
8 TECHNOL  Technology 
9 BASIC  Basic industries 
10 CAPITAL  Capital goods 
11 UTILITY  Public utilities 
99 UNDESIGN  Miscellaneous/Undesignated 
Note: taken from DataStream on I/B/E/S Industry Classification 
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Appendix 3 
Disclosure Type  Definition  Category Examples  
0 No disclosure  
  
1 Pure narrative disclosure related to 
category definition  
GEN “BP operating management system (OMS) lays out the standards and 
processes required for environmentally and socially responsible operations” 
(BP Annual Report 2011, p.69) 
 
2 Pure narrative disclosure with more 
details  
ENE 
 
 
ACT 
 
 
“We seek to manage operational greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions through 
our OMS, which requires businesses to incorporate energy use considerations 
in their business plans and to assess, prioritize and implement technologies 
and systems to improve energy usage” (BP Annual Report 2011, p.65) 
 
“Tesco co-chair the Sustainability Steering Group of the Consumer Goods 
Forum, and is leading the project announced in December 2010 to achieve 
zero net deforestation by 2020. This work involves developing and 
committing to sustainable supply chains for palm oil, timber, soy, paper and 
beef” (Tesco Annual Report 2011, p.36) 
 
3 Quantitative disclosures addressing 
issue in numerical way 
LIAB 
 
LIAB 
“BP environmental expenditure related to the Gulf of Mexico oil spell (Spill 
Response) in 2011 is $585 million” (BP Annual Report 2011, p.71) 
 
“ BP clean- ups in 2011 is $53 million” (BP Annual Report 2011, p.71) 
 
 
4 Quantitative disclosures with narrative 
explanation  
LIAB 
 
 
 
GEN 
 “During the year, BP entered a framework agreement with natural resource 
trustee for the United States and five Gulf Coast states, providing for up to $1 
billion to be spent on early restoration projects to address natural resource 
injuries resulting from the Gulf of Mexico oil spill” (BP Annual Report 2011, 
p.71) 
 
“During 2011, over 50% of the new diesel earnings introduced to our 
worldwide fleet were certified to at least Tier 2 in North America or the 
equivalent Stage 2 standard in Europe. At the same time, more than 10% of 
new sets were certified to Tier 3/Stage 3 or above” (Aggreko Annual Report 
2011, p.50)  
5 Quantitative disclosures including 
narrative statements demonstrating 
year comparison  
LIAB  “BP continues to incur sig ificant costs related to the 2010 Gulf of Mexico 
oil spill. The spill response cost incurred during 2012 is $118 million (2011 
$671 million), and $345 million (2011 $336 million) remains as a provision 
at 31 December 2012” (BP Annual Report 2011, p.71) 
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